Iraq Security Situation Review – January 2026(Issue No. 287 in Total)

  February 10, 2026

Iraq Security Situation Review – January 2026

Researcher No. 006


Based on monitoring reports from Hanwei International’s Iraq Security Officer and relevant media coverage, Hanwei International analysis concludes that Iraq’s security situation remained highly fragile in January, with a marked rise in localized unrest risks. The situation is characterized by:
  • Political and Economic Dimensions: Persistent disputes over the prime ministerial nomination; a caretaker government constrained by the constitution, leading to decision‑making gridlock and governance vacuum; market volatility triggered by tariff policy adjustments and a widening fiscal deficit; and widespread, escalating protests across multiple sectors.

  • U.S. Intervention: The spillover of U.S.-Iran tensions into Iraq, with domestic armed groups voicing solidarity with Iran; and the U.S. continuing to transfer ISIS detainees to Iraq, sparking sovereignty disputes and internal security concerns.

  • Social Security: Frequent shootings across multiple governorates, plunging several regions into turmoil and undermining regional security.



I. Political and Economic Dimensions

(1) Controversy Over New Prime Ministerial Nomination; Limited Authority of the Caretaker Government

Following the withdrawal of incumbent caretaker Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al‑Sudani from re‑election, and the Shiite Coordination Framework (CF) reconciling opposition from key factions—including the Sadrist Movement, Asa’ib Ahl al‑Haq, and the Badr Organization—to former Prime Minister Nouri al‑Maliki’s candidacy, Maliki was ultimately nominated as the next prime minister. This nomination sparked widespread controversy domestically and regionally:
  • Domestic: Shiite factions, which suppressed dissent to maintain bloc unity, exhibited “superficial unity with internal divisions.” Some Sunni political forces held complex, ambivalent positions.

  • International: Iran adopted a “conditional support” stance to consolidate its proxy influence, while the U.S. threatened sanctions to prevent excessive infiltration by Iran‑affiliated armed groups into the new government.

Meanwhile, Sudani’s caretaker government faced parliamentary pushback. Economic policies—including adjustments to university stipends, hikes in import tariffs, and salary disbursements—were challenged as unconstitutional and stalled in deliberations, severely paralyzing fiscal regulation and livelihood security. Against the backdrop of a contentious prime ministerial nomination, slow progress in presidential elections, and the failure to form a new government, the caretaker government’s “governance vacuum” will further stoke public discontent and exacerbate social tensions.

(2) Tariff Policy Changes Trigger Volatility; Fiscal Deficit Widens

The General Authority of Customs recently announced new regulations: effective January 1, 2026, a mandatory pre‑declaration customs clearance system will be fully implemented. All traders/importers must submit pre‑declaration information via a designated system before cargo arrival and complete the process before financial settlement. Concurrently, tariffs on select goods were adjusted: hybrid vehicles will be subject to applicable duties, and gold will be taxed at 5% of its value. Other vehicle categories, machinery, basic consumer goods, and foodstuffs remain unaffected.
On January 17, data from the Central Bank of Iraq revealed that public expenditures exceeded revenues in the first ten months of 2025, widening the fiscal deficit and intensifying fiscal imbalance pressures. Recurrent spending reached 96.378 trillion Iraqi dinars (≈$66.5 billion), while investment spending was only 19.157 trillion dinars (≈$13.2 billion), highlighting severe underinvestment in livelihoods and development. The failure to pass the 2025 detailed budget underscores the marginalization of public welfare amid political factional rivalry.

(3) Mass Protests Erupt Over Livelihoods; Kurds Express Cross‑Border Solidarity

  • Mass Protests:

    • Healthcare: Medical staff at multiple hospitals in Basra Governorate staged repeated sit‑ins demanding the immediate hiring of 2024 medical school graduates.

    • Livelihood Support: Persons with disabilities and their families in Sulaymaniyah Governorate rallied to demand winter fuel subsidies; over 17,000 disabled residents in the province reportedly lack such subsidies amid harsh winter conditions.

    • Education: Faculty at Qasim University in Babylon Governorate launched an indefinite sit‑in after the Prime Minister’s Office decided to cut certain university stipends, paralyzing campus operations. Protests have spread to universities in Babylon, Baghdad, and other governorates, with potential for larger‑scale demonstrations in Baghdad.

  • Cross‑Border Solidarity: On January 20, Kurds across Iraq held rallies in solidarity with Syrian Kurds. In Erbil, hundreds of Kurds and activists staged three protests—at the UN office, U.S. Consulate, and city center—calling for international intervention in clashes between Syrian government forces and the Syrian Democratic Forces, which have killed ~10 civilians and triggered new displacement. Protests also occurred in Diyala and Kirkuk Governorates, condemning attacks on Kurdish civilians by Syrian armed forces.


II. U.S. Intervention Dimensions

(1) Escalating U.S.-Iran Rivalry; Iraq Rejects Becoming a “Frontline”

Since early January, U.S. President Donald Trump has adopted a hardline stance on Iran, not ruling out military intervention. On January 15, the Shiite Coordination Framework— a key bloc in Iraq’s ruling coalition—issued a formal statement rejecting the use of Iraqi territory as a launchpad for military operations against Iran, citing severe violations of Iraqi sovereignty, national security, and public interests. On January 16, the Iran‑backed militia Kata’ib Hezbollah warned that any U.S. military action against Iran would trigger attacks on all U.S. military facilities in Iraq and the region, with missiles and drones ready for deployment. On January 17, supporters of Iraqi armed factions rallied on Palestine Street in Baghdad to express solidarity with Iran. However, on January 26, the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group entered the Middle East, reinforcing the U.S. military presence and risking further destabilization of Iraq’s security and heightened risks of localized armed conflict.

(2) Transfer of ISIS Detainees to Iraq Exacerbates Domestic Controversy

U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirmed the launch of an ISIS detainee transfer program: the first batch of 150 detainees held in Hasakah, northeast Syria, has been relocated to “secure locations” in Iraq, with up to 7,000 more potentially transferred. This unilateral U.S. decision has sparked sovereignty disputes and internal divisions in Iraq. While judicial authorities pledge to process detainees in accordance with the law, large‑scale transfers carry risks of oversight lapses and detainee escapes. Combined with existing weapons‑smuggling risks, escaped terrorists could easily acquire arms, reviving extremist activity and increasing attacks on civilians and government targets.

III. Social Security Dimensions – Shooting Incidents

In January, shooting incidents occurred across Maysan, Dhi Qar, Basra, and Baghdad Governorates, targeting civilians, security personnel, and armed group members. Maysan Governorate, where curfews were repeatedly extended amid spiraling unrest, emerged as a major security hotspot.
  • Maysan Governorate: Early January saw multiple assassinations and heightened tensions. A security official in his 50s was fatally shot in Kahlaa District in a clan‑related attack. An assassination attempt on a leader of the Peace Brigades in Amara was followed by the group burning the Provincial Council Chairman’s office and firing into the air; no direct clashes with the Ahrar al‑Haq Brigades occurred. Security forces swiftly imposed a curfew and blocked major roads to prevent escalation.

  • Dhi Qar Governorate: A taxi driver in Nasiriyah was shot dead and his vehicle stolen by unknown assailants posing as passengers; the perpetrators remain at large.

  • Basra Governorate: A 30‑year‑old man carrying flowers was shot dead (four times) in central Basra.

  • Baghdad Governorate: In Baghdad’s Karrada District, gunmen shot and killed a civilian riding a tricycle near the Ghazala Restaurant.


Security Recommendations for Chinese Enterprises and Individuals in Iraq

For Enterprises

  1. Uphold Neutrality to Mitigate Political Risks: Maintain strict neutrality; avoid exclusive, private partnerships with specific factions or individuals. Refrain from involvement in political processes—including the prime ministerial nomination, presidential elections, and cabinet formation—and distance from factional strife. Upgrade security at project camps and offices, deploy professional security personnel, and strengthen on‑site security systems.

  2. Monitor Policy Changes to Ensure Operational Stability: Closely track adjustments to investment and tariff policies, assess potential impacts on operations, and ensure compliance to avoid risks such as asset seizures or project suspensions due to policy shifts.

For Individuals

  1. Minimize Non‑Essential Travel; Avoid High‑Risk Zones: Avoid areas near parliament, political/armed faction strongholds, protest hotspots, and U.S./Iran‑related facilities. Limit travel, especially at night or during peak crowds. Carry valid ID and avoid large cash or valuables.

  2. Heed Official Alerts; Maintain Communication: Monitor security advisories from the Chinese Embassy and Consulates in Iraq, stay updated on social dynamics and risk warnings, and save emergency contacts—including consular protection hotlines, local police, and reputable medical facilities. In the event of factional/clan/family conflicts, civil unrest, or extremist attacks, immediately seek shelter, contact local police, and alert the embassy/consulate for assistance, cooperating with on‑site response efforts.